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USIB-D-41.12/11
IBSEC-PR/4
22 September 1964
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT : Review of the Procedures and Standards
Within the Intelligence Community for the
Control of Sanitization and Downgrading
of Sensitive Intelligence

REFERENCES : a. USIB-M-269, 8 May 1963, Item 9
b. USIB-AM-63/25 of 10 May 1963, Subject:
"Public Disclosure of Classified Intelligence"
c. USIB-D-41.12/9 of 13 January 1964,
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d. COMOR-D-7/29 of 11 July 1964
"Report on Downgrading and Sanitization"

INTRODUCTION

1. The United States Intelligence Board on 10 May 1963 directed the Security Committee, in coordination with the Committees on SIGINT, Overhead Reconnaissance, and Guided Missiles, as appropriate, to conduct a review of the intelligence community's procedures and standards for the control of the sanitization and downgrading of sensitive intelligence (see refs. a. and b.). The intelligence involved was that

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Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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controlled by the COMINT and TALENT-KEYHOLE Security Control Systems. The present report is responsive to that directive and concludes an extensive investigation of the relevant procedures and standards.

2. On 13 January 1964 the Security Committee submitted a preliminary report to the Board on its findings and recommendations concerning COMINT (see ref. c). The Board deferred action pending the completion at the request of the Security Committee of a review by COMOR of the procedures for sanitization and downgrading of TALENT and TALENT-KEYHOLE material.

3. COMOR's study, concurred in by all the Board's committees concerned, has been completed and has been taken into account in this report by the Security Committee (COMOR's report is distributed separately as COMOR-D-7/29, see ref. d).

4. The Security Committee believes that the Board should now approve definitions for the terms "sanitization," "decontrol," "downgrading," and "declassification" and the recommendations on actions to be taken in regard to the COMINT and the TALENT-KEYHOLE Security Control Systems. These recommendations are taken from the respective COMINT and TALENT-KEYHOLE studies, and they have the concurrence of the appropriate committees of the Board. In the following sections there is a brief discussion, in turn, of the background and rationale which lie behind the recommendations. A more complete discussion is available to the Board members in the relevant reference documents.

DEFINITIONS

5. In reference c. above it was noted that the Committee found confusing and often overlapping definitions for the existing terms of "sanitization," "downgrading," and "declassification." The Committee considered that the term "downgrading" should apply only to the lowering of level of classification as set forth in Executive Order 10501 and the term "declassification" should apply only to removal of classification

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and neither term should be extended to describe the removal of classified material from a system of compartmentation. In this regard, the Committee felt that a new term, "decontrol", was required for this purpose. The Committee also found that the term "sanitization" is being used to describe certain prescribed procedures of editing which, however, do not absolutely conceal sources and methods. The Committee strongly affirms that the word "sanitization" should be applied strictly to describe only those procedures which absolutely ensure source concealment. To ensure uniform understanding and effective security, the Committee considered it necessary that uniform definitions be adopted by the intelligence community.

COMINT

6. The Board will recall that the Security Committee and the SIGINT Committee found that the policy guidance in DCID 6/3, governing sanitization and downgrading of COMINT, was adequate; however, there were variations within the departments and agencies in the implementation of this guidance. Further, there was a lack of focal points established to authorize, control, and record sanitizations. Specific action recommended would ensure greater source protection through the establishment of centralized control authorities to ensure that sensitive COMINT sources are protected.

TALENT-KEYHOLE

7. In considering the sanitization and downgrading of T and KH material, the Security Committee noted that although no T- or KH-derived material had been involved in the unauthorized disclosure cited in the first paragraph, the sanitization procedures did not ensure absolute source protection in every instance. The Committee recognized that T and KH information had to be broken out to meet urgent national defense targeting requirements and noted the sanitization procedures established to prepare those publications. However, the Committee found that these sanitized materials were being used and disseminated

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beyond the uses originally intended, which jeopardized sensitive sources. The establishment of control points within the departments and agencies was considered necessary to ensure that publications and other materials utilizing sanitized T and KH material be disseminated and utilized only for purposes originally intended.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

9. It is recommended that the Board approve:

a. The following definitions:

(1) Sanitization - The effective concealment in classified material of intelligence sources and methods. A pre-requisite for sanitization is the existence or reasonable presumption of the existence of a separate and logical, less sensitive source. Information may not be reported in the sanitization with a precision or exactness that exceeds the capability of the less sensitive source.

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(2) Decontrol - The removal of material from a system of compartmentation for sensitive intelligence, provided it remains classified.

(3) Downgrading - The change of existing classification to a lower level of classification.

(4) Declassification - The complete removal of classification. (This includes removal from a system of control.)

b. The following statement of principles pertaining to the sanitization of COMINT:

(1) Extensive and/or precise facts and figures leading back to COMINT source should not be included in the sanitized material.

(2) If sanitization is for a specific use and not intended for broad dissemination, then an appropriate caveat or control (as provided for in DCID 1/7) should be placed upon the sanitized material to ensure that it is disseminated and used only for that intended purpose.

(3) Material which is sanitized for broad dissemination and use based upon classification and need-to-know should be closely reviewed to ensure that sanitization procedures followed absolutely ensure source protection.

(4) Focal points should be established within each department and agency to authorize and record the sanitization and downgrading of COMINT. Information recorded would include the name of the requester, the purpose of the

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sanitization or downgrading, the document in which the sanitized material is to be included, and a copy of the sanitization.

c. The following actions pertaining to TALENT and TALENT-KEYHOLE Security Control Systems:

(1) The TALENT Sanitization Manual and its annexes be revised at the earliest opportunity, the revisions to be based on the recommendations set forth in Tab A of the COMOR report (COMOR-D-7/29 of 11 July 1964).

(2) The revision of the TALENT Sanitization Manual be specific as to releasing authorities and responsibilities and specific as to procedures for controlling the dissemination and use of sanitized decontrolled information.

(3) Each annex of the TALENT Sanitization Manual include a listing of the publications in which authority has been granted to include sanitized T-KH information.

(4) Each annex of the TALENT Sanitization Manual contain definitive instructions on sanitization and removal from the T-KH system of control to eliminate areas susceptible to variance in interpretation or application.

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previously authorized by USIB with respect to
certain commonwealth countries, must be
referred to USIB for approval.

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R. L. Bannerman
Chairman

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